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Abstract
Post-crisis policy interventions significantly increased the demand for mortgage refinanc-
ing, but could this surge in refinancing applications have crowded out the supply of credit
to home buyers? In this paper, we examine two frictions that hamper financial inter-
mediation and result in banks’ substitution of home purchase loans for refinance loans:
The risk capacity channel through which banks with limited risk appetites prefer safer
loans over riskier loans, and the operating capacity channel through which banks with
limited operating capacities prefer applications that require less screening time. We find
that following the recent financial crisis, banks facing these capacity constraints indeed
rationed credit to home purchase borrowers.
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1. Introduction
It is widely documented that home buyers had limited access to credit during and after the
Great Recession,1 despite the policy interventions that were put in place to lower the bars
for credit access. The Federal Reserve’s monetary stimulus, often referred to as Quantitative
Easing (QE), did result in an increase in mortgage borrowing, but the increase was driven by
refinancing loans instead of loans for home purchases. Figure 1 reports the aggregate trend in
mortgage applications by loan type using the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data.
The figure clearly shows that the increase in loan applications after 2008 Q4 was mostly due
to the increase in mortgage applications for refinances not for home purchases. The difference
between refinance mortgages and home purchase mortgages becomes even more dramatic when
we compare the number of mortgages originated or the amounts of mortgages originated as
in Figure 2 and 3.
A natural question is whether it was due to the credit rationing to home buyers during this
period, not merely due to the weaker demand for credit, and if so, what frictions contributed
to the credit rationing on the supply side. More specifically, is it possible that the increase
in mortgage originations for refinance during this period crowded out the credit availability
to potential home buyers due to some frictions in credit supply? This question not only has
implications on the distribution of credit to different borrowers, but also has a macroeco-
nomic implication—if home buyers’ marginal propensities to consume are greater than that
of refinancing borrowers,2 then this crowd-out effect caused by the financial intermediation
frictions could impede the transmission of monetary policy and dampen the policy impact on
stimulating aggregate output.
1For instance, “Lopsided Housing Rebound Leaves Millions of People Out in the Cold” from the Wall
Street Journal (https://www.wsj.com/articles/lopsided-housing-rebound-leaves-millions-of-people-out-in-the-
cold-1470852996) notes that “The housing recovery that began in 2012 has lifted the overall market but left
behind a broad swath of the middle class, threatening to create a generation of permanent renters and sowing
economic anxiety and frustration for millions of Americans.”, and “The lopsided recovery has shut out millions
of aspiring homeowners who have been forced to rent because of damaged credit, swelling student loans, tough
credit standards and a dearth of affordable homes, economists said.”
2The marginal propensity to consume is documented to be higher for poorer (Mian et al. (2013)), lower
income (Di Maggio et al. (2017)), and lower credit scores (Agarwal et al. (2015)) households.
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In this paper, we propose and test two channels that are likely to have impeded the financial
intermediation function of banks and contributed to this crowd-out effect: the risk capacity
channel and the operating capacity channel. When banks face these capacity constraints,
they would try to substitute home purchase loans with refinance loans. We argue that both of
these capacity constraints became more binding after 2008, and examine whether banks with
more limited capacities during this period chose to originate more refinance loans but limited
the origination of home purchase loans.
With frictionless financial intermediation, a lending bank should be able to originate any
mortgages, regardless of whether they are for home purchases or refinances, as long as they are
profitable. Here, loan origination decisions would be made based solely on loan and borrower
characteristics. With intermediation frictions imposing certain capacity limits, however, the
origination decisions across loans might not be independent: the addition of one loan could
affect the origination decisions of the others.
The first friction, referred to as the risk capacity channel, arises when banks have limited
capacity for risk taking, due to, for instance, depleted capital and/or stricter regulations.
When this is the case, a bank should on the margin prefer less risky loans to riskier loans,
holding the profitability of those loans fixed, because riskier lending would require more eco-
nomic (or regulatory) capital to hold against. As refinance mortgages are less risky than home
purchase mortgages for lending banks with access to the borrowers’ credit information and/or
soft information about the local areas (Gilje et al. (2016)), a bank with limited risk capacity
would tilt its mortgage portfolio towards refinance loans over home purchase loans.
The second friction, referred to as the operating capacity channel, arises from loan officers’
limited capacity for processing and screening loan applications (Sharpe and Sherlund (2016),
Fuster et al. (2017)). If the operating capacity binds such that a loan officer is sitting on a
pile of (unfinished) applications, she would select applications that take less time to screen,
which would tilt her preference towards less labor intensive refinance loans to home purchase
loans.
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We implement our empirical analyses using the bank-level quarterly panel data from 2004
to 2013, matching the mortgage application/origination information in HMDA data with
bank characteristics in Call Reports. In testing the risk capacity channel, we exploit cross-
sectional variation in banks’ capitalization, measured by the tier 1 capital ratio. In testing
the operating capacity channel, we construct a measure of banks’ “operating capacity” using
the unique feature of the confidential HMDA data managed by the Federal Reserve Board,
providing information on two important dates for each loan application: application date
and action (origination decision) date. First of all, knowing these two dates enables us to
match the banks’ loan origination activities to quarterly bank characteristics at a frequency
that links the two more closely than the annual frequency provided in the public version
of HMDA. Second, we are able to capture how many days a lender spent screening a given
application, as well as the fraction of “uncompleted” applications at a certain point in time,
which supposedly captures the degrees of operating capacity faced by different banks. We
exploit cross-sectional variation in banks’ “operating slack” as explained above, measured by
the fraction of uncompleted applications at the end of each quarter out of the total applications
received in that quarter, after controlling for bank-level average screening time per application.
We argue that both of these capacity constraints would bind for (at least certain) banks
after 2008 Q4. Risk capacity binds more due to banks’ low risk appetite, stricter risk manage-
ment, and regulatory burden. Operating capacity binds more due to the surge in mortgage
applications, as well as stricter risk management requiring more careful screening of the loan
applications. Therefore, we test whether, relative to their lending patterns during 2004-08,
banks with limited risk/operating capacity increased refinance originations but decreased home
purchase originations in comparison with banks that have more slack in these capacities. We
find that the substitution effect—preferring refinance loans to home purchase loans—is indeed
stronger for banks with limited capacities (both risk capacity and operating capacity) during
2009-13.
In examining the credit supply channel, it is critical to control for any factors that might be
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related to the demand side for identification. For the risk taking channel, it is possible that the
undercapitalized banks mainly operate in local markets that have been affected more heavily
by the housing bust, and thus face lower demand for home purchases, instead of actively
avoiding these loans. However, if this differential demand factor drives our results, then it
should not explain why these banks originated more refinance loans as the refinancing demand
in these local markets, which is a function of LTV, would also have been weaker. Nonetheless,
we include HQ × Y ear fixed effects in our bank-level panel regressions to control for the
variations in local economic conditions, where HQ stands for the location (state) of a bank’s
headquarter, hence comparing banks with varying capacities within their local markets. We
further estimate mortgage application-level regressions on the loan approval decision (approved
or denied) where we can control for local (county level) economic characteristics more tightly.
Our findings are robust.
The operating capacity channel would also be affected by the risk-taking capacity as banks
with limited risk capacity would implement more careful screening processes. We attempt to
isolate the operating capacity channel from the tighter risk capacity channel by identifying the
operating capacity that was mainly affected through increased loan applications stimulated by
policy interventions. Specifically, we control for quarterly bank-level average screening times,
which allows us to compare banks with different levels of “uncompleted” applications while
requiring the same processing time per application. We further analyze within-bank variations
by comparing the counties with limited operating capacity to the counties with sufficient
operating capacity for the same bank. Assuming a bank would impose the same lending
standards across different markets, this within-bank analysis helps us isolate the operating
capacity channel from the risk capacity channel.
Our results imply that banks with limited capacities would try to substitute the credit
to potential home buyers with the credit to refinancing borrowers, who are existing home
owners. Note that, all else being equal, this substitution would prevail more often if there is
an exogenous increase in refinancing demand, e.g. monetary policy stimulus. When banks are
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facing binding capacity, the monetary stimulus would induce an increase in both refinancing
and home purchase demand, but banks might substitute toward refinance originations and
away from home purchase originations. This not only limits the credit access of certain
borrowers, possibly those that are younger or less wealthy, but there could be a macroeconomic
effect if these rationed borrowers have a greater marginal propensity for consumption.
Our first contribution is to the emerging literature that analyzes distributional effects of
post-crisis policy interventions. Beraja et al. (2017), focusing on monetary policy transmission,
find that the Federal Reserve’s QE amplified existing regional disparities, while Agarwal et al.
(2015) and D’Acunto and Rossi (2017) analyze credit redistribution among heterogeneous
households after the recent financial crisis. More generally, examining the transmission of
monetary policy across the heterogeneous agents in the economy, Di Maggio et al. (2017) and
Ippolito et al. (2015) empirically document the responses of heterogeneously indebted agents.
Auclert (2015), Choi et al. (2017), Kaplan et al. (2016) build a theoretical model of monetary
transmission with heterogenous agents. We study the distributional effect of post-crisis policy
interventions by the tenure status of households.
This paper is also related to recent studies examining the effect of post-crisis monetary
stimulus on mortgage supply (Scharfstein and Sunderam (2016), Chakraborty et al. (2016),
Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017), and Di Maggio et al. (2016)). Scharfstein and Sun-
deram (2016) find that market frictions (limited competition) hamper the stimulus effects,
and Chakraborty et al. (2016) document a crowd-out effect that the expansion in banks’
mortgage lending during the QE periods reduced commercial lending. We study the crowd-
out effect from refinance mortgages to home purchase mortgages, which may hamper the
stimulus effect through the heterogeneity in marginal propensity to consumption. Sharpe and
Sherlund (2016) and Fuster et al. (2017) study the role of operating capacity in monetary
transmission. These two papers analyze the intermediary sector as a whole, while we focus
on the micro level variation for an identification of this channel.
More broadly, this paper is related to the literatures on monetary policy transmission
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through the bank lending channel (Bernanke and Blinder (1992); Kashyap and Stein (1995);
Peek and Rosengren (2000); and Kashyap and Stein (2000)). Recent literature on risk taking
channel (Peydro´ and Maddaloni (2011); Borio and Zhu (2012); Dell’Ariccia et al. (2013);
andJime´nez et al. (2014)) suggests that banks would lend more to “riskier” borrowers in
response to monetary loosening, while we find that this is not the case when banks’ risk
capacity is limited—riskier borrowers could on the contrary get crowded out as banks face an
increase in credit demand of “safer” borrowers. Hence, while our analysis mainly focuses on the
distributional impact, this mechanism has novel implications on monetary policy transmission
through the banking sector, both with the bank lending channel and the risk taking channel.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop our empirical hypothesis. In
Section 3, we discuss our data. The empirical findings are presented in Section 4. We conclude
in Section 5.
2. Empirical Hypothesis
In this section, we develop our testable hypotheses on bank mortgage credit supply. In a
frictionless economy, a lending bank should be able to originate all mortgages, regardless of
whether they are for home purchase or refinance, as long as they are profitable. Therefore, loan
origination decisions should be independent across different applications, and be made solely
based on loan and borrower characteristics. With financial frictions, however, the origination
decisions across loans might not be independent from each other, as the lender would face
certain capacity limits. In some cases, when considering refinance loans and home purchase
loans, lenders might prefer one to the other. We suggest and test two frictions that could have
impeded the intermediation process that lead banks to substitute home purchase originations
with refinance originations during and after the Great Recession.
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2.1. Risk capacity channel
The first constraint, the risk capacity channel, stems from banks’ limited capacity for risk tak-
ing. Suppose that a bank becomes thinly capitalized, or its risk appetite becomes constrained
due to, for instance, more careful risk management or stricter regulatory requirements. Then,
the bank should on the margin prefer less risky loans to riskier loans, holding the profitability
of those loans fixed, because the bank would be required to hold more economic (or regulatory)
capital against riskier lending.
Mortgage origination adds risk to banks’ balance sheets. When the “risk capacity” for
banks binds, this could affect banks’ preferences on the margin between the two mortgage
types, i.e., home purchase and refinance. Between the two types of mortgage originations,
the latter can be less risky than the former from the lending banks’ perspectives, as banks
can observe the previous payment history and/or obtain soft information about the borrowers
and local areas (Gilje et al. (2016)). Therefore, all else being equal, a bank with limited risk
capacity would tilt its mortgage loan portfolio towards refinances over home purchases. We
thus have the following prediction:
Hypothesis 1: If a bank’s risk capacity is binding, it would choose to reduce home purchase
mortgage originations and increase refinance mortgage originations, compared to banks with
non-binding risk capacity.
If a bank’s risk capacity is perfectly slack, it should in principle be able to originate all
profitable mortgages. Here, loan origination decisions are independent across the loans. On
the other hand, a bank wouldn’t be able to take on any additional risk when faced with
strictly binding risk capacity. However, it could still substitute riskier loans (home purchases)
for less risky loans (refinancing loans) to increase the number of originated loans given the
binding constraint. This substitution effect would become more pronounced if a bank faces
an exogenous surge in refinancing applications, for instance due to monetary loosening.
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Regarding the recent financial crisis and the recession following Lehman Brothers’ fail-
ure in the fourth quarter of 2008, we suppose that risk capacity mattered more during the
post-crisis period (“post period”) after Lehman’s failure compared to the pre-crisis period
(“pre period”). This could be due to stricter capital requirements, changes in risk percep-
tion and appetite, more illiquid secondary markets and greater putback risk, or increased risk
in mortgage origination itself with less valuable collateral. Therefore, the substitution effect
should become more pronounced during the post period than the pre period. Note that this
change would apply to all banks as it is driven by the change in the aggregate environment.
In addition, note that risk capacity would more likely to bind if a bank is thinly capitalized.
Therefore, we have the following predictions:
Hypothesis 1’: Banks would have a stronger preference for refinance mortgages over home
purchase mortgages in the post period relative to the pre period. This substitution effect would
be more pronounced for under-capitalized banks.
2.2. Operating capacity channel
The second constraint, denoted as the operating capacity channel, arises from loan officers’
limited capacities for processing and screening mortgage applications. All else equal, a loan
officer without a binding operating constraint should be indifferent between the two types of
mortgage applications. However, if the operating capacity binds such that a loan officer is
sitting on a pile of (unfinished) applications, she would wish to process more applications per
unit hour and would choose applications that takes less time to screen (Sharpe and Sherlund
(2016)). This would result for her to processing loan applications that require less screening
time first.
Figure 4 shows the time series of average loan processing time by loan type using HMDA.
We define the average difference between the loan application date and the decision date in a
quarter as the banks’ loan processing time for the quarter. Panel B of Figure 4 compares the
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average processing time of home purchase mortgages and refinance mortgages from 2004 to
2014. As presented in the figure, refinance applications usually take less time to screen than
home purchase applications.3
Again, this could be in part due to previously acquired credit information and soft in-
formation about the borrower and the local areas, particularly so if the lenders are current
servicers of the loans. Or it could be simply due to less “labor” required for refinance applica-
tions for not having to check multiple legal issues.4 Therefore, all else being equal, banks with
limited operating capacities would tilt their mortgage portfolios towards refinance mortgages
over home purchase mortgages, compared to banks with sufficient operating capacity. Hence,
we have the following prediction:
Hypothesis 2: If a bank’s operating capacity binds, it would prefer processing refinance mort-
gage applications first, thus resulting in a higher volume of refinance originations and fewer
home purchase originations.
We now focus on the comparison of operating capacity before and after 2008 Q4. As can be
seen in Figure 1, total mortgage applications partly recovered following the crisis, which were
likely driven by an increase in refinance applications in response to policy interventions such as
QE (Quantitative Easing) or HARP (Home Affordable Refinance Program). However, Figure
4 suggests that the average screening time per application increased significantly after 2008,
indicating that more banks had reached their operating capacities during this period (Sharpe
and Sherlund (2016), Fuster et al. (2017)). Hence, this capacity concern could have led to
more refinance originations that further crowded out home purchase originations during this
period. Furthermore, this substitution effect would be particularly pronounced among banks
3This interpretation should come with the caveat that we do not control for loan and/or lender character-
istics. The average screening time for refinancing loans increases rapidly in 2012 and 2013, possibly reflecting
the rapid increase in the refinance applications during this time period (see Figure 1).
4For instance, Buchak et al. (2017) note that for refinancing screening, “lender benefits from many on-the-
ground activities, such as a title check, structural examination, negotiations between buyer and seller, having
already taken place at the time of purchase”.
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faced with binding operating capacity constraints. We thus have the following predictions:
Hypothesis 2’: Banks would have a stronger preference for refinance mortgages over home
purchase mortgages in the QE-period relative to the pre-QE period. This substitution effect
would be more pronounced for banks with limited operating capacity.
3. Data and Summary Statistics
We use confidential HMDA loan application data from 2004:I to 2013:IV5 in order to con-
struct bank-quarter data on banks’ mortgage origination activities. According to the HMDA
reporting guide by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), the con-
fidential HMDA provides the exact loan application dates and decision dates (approved or
denied) while the publicly available HMDA only reports the year of mortgage originations.6
Having these two dates information enables us to link banks’ loan origination activities to
quarterly bank characteristics. We include conventional mortgages for the property type of
one-to-four family to aggregate banks’ mortgage originations by loan purpose: refinance and
home purchase.7
To construct variables for quarterly bank characteristics, we collect quarterly data from
the Federal Reserve’s Report of Condition and Income (“Call Reports”). First, we merge the
Call Report data with HMDA through the RSSD IDs. We then aggregate all subsidiaries of
a bank into a top holder. For banks that have the Call Report item RSSD9348 (RSSD ID of
the top holder) populated, we aggregate the bank-level variables by RSSD9348.8 For banks
that do not have the RSSD9348 field populated, we use their Call Report data and interpret
5On December 18, 2013 FOMC announced the “tapering” of QE3.
6See https://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/2013guide.pdf, or https://www.federalreserve.gov/files/pia hmda.pdf.
7Home purchase loans include the loans with home purchase as the loan purpose in HMDA. Refinance
loans include the loans with refinance and home improvement as the loan purpose field in HMDA.
8We drop bank-quarter observations when the top holder ID changes to minimize the effect from merge
and acquisition activities.
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these as stand-alone commercial banks. For each quarter, our sample consists of 3250 banks
on average.9
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of variables at the bank-level. Panel A reports the
summary statistics based on all sample observations. Refinance(#) is the number of mortgage
origination for refinance by a bank in a quarter, which has a mean of 200.12 and a standard
deviation of 3070.67. Refinance($) is the amount of mortgage origination for refinance by a
bank in a quarter, which has a mean of 35.90 mils and a standard deviation of 662.27 mils.
Purchase(#) is the number of mortgage origination for home purchase by a bank in a quarter,
which has a mean of 94.31 and a standard deviation of 1635.80. Purchase($) is the amount
of mortgage origination for home purchase by a bank in a quarter, which has a mean of 19.96
mils and a standard deviation of 380.41 mils.
Bank characteristics we mainly control in our analysis are reported. Quarterly bank control
variables are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% levels. Assets is the bank’s total assets in millions
US dollar, which has a mean of 3.2 billion with a standard deviation of 47 billion. Liquid
Asset Ratio is the ratio of liquid assets (sum of cash, fed funds lending and reverse repo, and
securities holding) to bank assets to control for asset liquidity, which has a mean of 0.28 with
a standard deviation of 0.13. Loan to Deposit Ratio is the ratio of total loan to total deposit,
which has a mean of 0.82 with a standard deviation of 0.18. RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio is
the ratio of real estate loans to total loans, which has a mean of 0.76 with a standard deviation
of 0.14. CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio is the ratio of CI loans to total loans, which has a mean
of 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.09. NPL Ratio is the ratio of non-performing loan in
total loan, which has a mean of 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.02. Tier 1 Capital Ratio
is the ratio of a bank’s tier 1 asset to total assets to control for bank soundness, which has a
mean of 0.14 with a standard deviation of 0.4.
In addition, we construct variables for measuring operating capacity using the unique
feature of confidential HMDA having exact date of application and decision. We calculate the
9We drop bank-quarter samples if the bank had more than a 10% change in total assets in a quarter,
following Campello (2002). We only include banks with all control variables.
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fraction of “uncompleted” applica tions as of the last date of each quarter out of the total
applications received in that quarter, which enables us to capture the measure of Operating
Capacity faced by different banks. That is, we associate a higher fraction of incomplete
applications with a lower operating capacity for that bank since it is rolling over most of its
applications unfinished to the next quarter. Operating Capacity has a mean of 0.31 with a
standard deviation of 0.17. That is, on average, 31% of loans applied are not fully processed
in that quarter. We also calculate the average number of days spent screening an application
as the Loan Processing Time for a bank in a quarter. Loan Processing Time has a mean of
33.66 with a standard deviation of 16.04. That is, on average, it takes 33.66 days to make a
decision on a loan application.
Loan-level characteristics are also reported. I Refinance is a dummy variable that equals
1 if the loan type is refinance mortgage and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 69% of applications
are for refinance and 31% of applications are for home purchase. I Loan Approval is a dummy
variable that equals to 1 if the loan is being approved and 0 otherwise. On average, 52%
of applied loans are approved. log Income is the log of household income as of mortgage
application. Loan to Income is the ratio of loan amount to income, where the mean is 2.07
with a standard deviation of 1.5. We also report the county level control variables that is
associated with mortgage application. Average population of counties are about 380,000,
with average Income per Capita of $39,000, average Unemployment rate of 6.66%. Average
home price index (HPI) is 153.32 using county level HPI from the CoreLogic.
Panel B reports the summary statistics by the Tier 1 Capital level. Low Tier 1 Capital is a
dummy variable for bottom 25% banks with low Tier 1 Capital Ratio. The top panel reports
the summary statistics of banks in Low Tier 1 Capital group and bottom panel reports the
summary statistics of the others. The average Tier 1 Capital Ratio in the top panel is 0.09
whereas the average Tier 1 Capital Ratio in the bottom panel is 0.16. Banks in Low Tier 1
Capital groups are on average, larger in size, lower in Liquid Asset Ratio, higher in Loan to
Deposit Ratio and higher in CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio. We also find that the banks in
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Low Tier 1 Capital groups reject more application while other loan characteristics are quite
similar.
Panel C reports the summary statistics by the Operating Capacity. Low Operating Ca-
pacity is a dummy variable for top 25% banks with high Operating Capacity. The top panel
reports the summary statistics of banks in Low Operating Capacity group and the bottom
panel reports the summary statistics of the others. The average Operating Capacity in the
top panel is 0.57 whereas the average Operating Capacity in the bottom panel is 0.26. Banks
in Low Operating Capacity groups are on average, larger in size and longer in loan process
time.
4. Empirical Results
We start with a visual inspection of the aggregate trend in mortgage originations. Figures
2 and 3 present the time series of the number and the amount of originations for refinance
and home purchase mortgages from HMDA data. Panel A includes all lenders in HMDA
whereas Panel B includes bank lenders only. One of the main differences in two Panels is
the originations before 2008: originations decline before 2008 in Panel A but not in Panel B.
After 2008, most of the changes in originations come from bank lenders.
Our main interest of this study is in bank lenders and Panel B of Figure 2 and 3 show that
home purchase mortgage originations by banks plunged in 2008 and stayed low afterwards,
while refinance mortgage originations picked up relatively quickly. While this difference may
be due to relatively weak demand for home purchase mortgages, we find that the approval
rate for refinancing applications also rebounded much more sharply after the crisis as in Panel
B of Figure 5. These two figures suggest a possible interpretation that lenders were more
likely to approve and originate refinance loans than home purchase loans after the crisis and
during the QE period, that is, after 2008 Q4, which we refer to as the post period.
We analyze bank-level lending activity and find a similar relation. Specifically, we estimate
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the following quarterly panel regression:
Yit = αq + αi + β · I Post + γ ·Xi,t−1 + it (1)
where I Post equals 1 for the post period of 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4, and zero otherwise, which
we refer to as the pre period. The dependent variables are total mortgage originations by
bank i at period t, for (i) refinances, (ii) home purchases, or (iii) the difference between the
two. Bank controls Xi,t−1 include 1 quarter lagged bank characteristics such as log Assets,
Liquid Asset Ratio reflecting asset liquidity, Loan to Deposit Ratio reflecting the asset-liability
maturity mismatch as well as loan demand, real estate (RE) and C&I (CI) Loans to Total
Loan Ratio to reflect business models, non-performing loan (NPL) Ratio, and Tier 1 Capital
Ratio to reflect financial soundness. We include bank fixed effects αi and quarter fixed effects
αq, a dummy for each quarter of the year to account for seasonality in mortgage origination.
All standard errors are clustered by bank.
Our main variable of interest is the coefficient β, and we are particularly interested in its
sign which indicates whether banks (i) increased their refinance mortgage originations, and
(ii) decreased their home purchase mortgage originations during the post period, relative to
their lending during the pre period. We also examine whether the divergence in bank lending
between refinances and home purchases widened during the post period.
[ Table 2 here ]
Table 2 reports the panel regression estimation results. Panel A reports the results using
the total amount of mortgage originations as a dependent variable. Column (1) uses the log
total amount of refinance mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter (logRefi$), column
(2) uses the log total amount of home purchase mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter
(logP$), and column (3) uses the difference of the two mortgage originations, i.e., (1)-(2). We
find that refinance origination significantly increased but home purchase origination signif-
icantly decreased during the post period relative to the pre period. The coefficient for the
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difference between the two originations is also positive and significant. The specifications in
columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) except for the inclusion of bank fixed effects,
and we find similar changes in mortgage origination practices within banks during the post
period. Panel B reports the estimation results using the total number of mortgage originations
as the dependent variable (logRefi#, logP#). The estimation results are similar.
Overall, the table suggests that, relative to the pre period of 2004–2008, banks originated
more refinance mortgages but less home purchase mortgages during the post period of 2009–
2013. However, it is not clear how much of this change is driven by the credit supply channel
as we don’t control for the demand side factors. For instance, refinancing demand could
have surged after 2008 Q4 while home purchase demand plunged. And the passive response
from banks to this change in credit demand could have resulted in the findings from the
above regressions, even without banks’ active adjustment in their lending practices between
two types of loans. To identify the bank supply channel from the demand channel, in the
following sections, we focus on the cross-sectional variations in bank characteristics that could
reflect frictions in financial intermediation, such as risk capacity and operating capacity, and
examine how these associate with banks’ lending behavior.
4.1. Testing the Risk Capacity Channel
We first test Hypothesis 1’ of Section 2, examining whether banks’ risk taking capabilities affect
their origination decisions between refinance and home purchase mortgages. We expect that
thinly-capitalized banks would shift their lending toward more refinances while limiting lending
for home purchases after 2008 Q4, relative to better-capitalized banks. We conduct a bank-
level analysis augmenting the previous regression specification. In particular, we estimate the
following panel regression:
Yit = αy + αq + αi + αHQ,y + β · I Post× Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1
+ φ · Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1 + γ ·Xi,t−1 + it (2)
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where Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1 equals 1 if a bank’s tier 1 capital ratio belongs to the bottom
quartile in the previous quarter, and zero otherwise. As before, I Post equals 1 for the post
period of 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4, and zero otherwise. αy is the year fixed effect, αq is the quarter
fixed effect, αi is the bank fixed effect, and αHQ,y is the Headquarter State × Y ear fixed effect
based on banks’ headquarter locations (states). Xi,t−1 includes 1 quarter lagged controls for
bank characteristics such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio, RE Loan
to Total Loan Ratio, CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, and NPL Ratio. Again, our coefficient of
interest is β, the coefficient on the interaction between I Post and Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1. As
risk capacity measured by banks’ capitalization becomes binding during the post period, we
expect a positive β for the origination of refinance mortgages, a negative β for the origination
of home purchase mortgages, and a positive β for the difference between the originations of
the two types of mortgages.
[ Table 3 here ]
Table 3 reports the estimation results. In Panel A, we use the total amount of mortgage
originations as the dependent variable. Column (1) uses the log total amount of mortgage
originations of refinance loans by a bank in a quarter (logRefi$). We include year fixed
effects (αy) and quarter fixed effects (αq). Due to the year fixed effects, we cannot identify
I Post and only report its interaction with Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1. We find that during the
post period, thinly-capitalized banks originated more refinance loans than better capitalized
banks. Column (2) uses the log total amount of mortgage originations of home purchase
loans by a bank in a quarter (logP$). We find that during the post period, thinly-capitalized
banks originated less home purchase loans than better capitalized banks although the effect is
statistically insignificant. Column (3) uses the difference in the two mortgage originations in
columns (1)-(2). This can be interpreted as “business mix” captured by the ratio of refinancing
originations to home purchase originations. We find statistically significant and positive β,
which shows that the substitution effect was larger in thinly-capitalized banks during the post
period than well-capitalized banks.
16
Note that there exists a confounding factor if local economic conditions affect both mort-
gage demand and banks’ capital ratio in a certain way. That is, deteriorating local economic
conditions could damage banks’ capitalization and shrink demand for mortgages at the same
time. To account for potential differences in local demand across states, in columns (4)-(6)
we additionally control for bank fixed effects and Headquarter State × Y ear fixed effects
(αHQ,y), which allows us to compare banks within a state.
10 Here, we test whether thinly cap-
italized banks, compared to other well-capitalized banks in the same local market, originated
more refinance mortgages but less home purchase mortgages during the post period.
In column (4), we find that thinly-capitalized banks indeed originated significantly more
refinancing mortgages than their counterparts in the same state during the post period. On
the other hand, their home purchase originations were significantly lower than their better
capitalized local peers as shown in column (5). This result mitigates some of the concern of
the confounding effect through the demand channel. Suppose our results are driven by the
demand effect, and also suppose that banks facing greater local refinancing demand also face
greater local home purchase demand. In this case, if the Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1 banks are
not actively choosing one type of mortgage over the other, then we should observe βs with
the same signs for refinance and home purchase originations. On the contrary, we observe a
positive β for refinances and negative β for home purchases, indicating the active portfolio
adjustments by banks with limited risk capacities.
In column (6), we use the difference of two origination types as the dependent variable,
which is a direct measure of shifts in lending practices. We find a positive and statistically
significant β. Again, this coefficient should be insignificant if the thinly-capitalized banks are
indifferent between the two types of mortgages, suggesting that the supply side through the
risk capacity channel was affecting banks’ lending behaviors.
Panel B reports the estimation results using the total number of mortgage originations as
10We note that this is not an ideal control for large banks who operate in multiple states. However, most
of our banks are small enough to be operating locally. For robustness, we run the same regression only using
local banks, defined as banks that collect more than 90% of their loan applications from a single state to find
the same results.
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the dependent variable. The estimation results are similar and the substitution effect gets
stronger.
Note that Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1 in Panel A and B defines the treatment group, i.e. banks
with binding risk capacity, in each quarter by the lagged bank capital ratio and it allows the
treatment group to vary over time. However, the capital ratio, even though we use a lagged
variable, could be endogenous. In our alternative specification, we define the treatment group
as those with low capital right before the treatment period, which is as of the end of 2008 Q4.
In this diff-in-diff specification, we analyze how the thinly capitalized bank at the initiation
of the post period adjusted their lending behavior during the post period, compared to their
counterparts with more of a capital cushion.
The estimation results are in Panel C and D. Specifications are the same as in Panel
A and B except we use Low Tier 1 Capital2008.Q4 instead of Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1. In
column (5) of Panel C, we find that the thinly capitalized banks at the end of 2008 originated
significantly fewer home purchase mortgages during the post period of 2009-2013 compared
to their counterparts in the same market. We would naturally expect the same decrease in
refinance originations for these banks (i.e. a negative β for columns 1 and 4), unless they have
actively tilted their preferences to refinancing over home purchase loans. We indeed find that
this is not the case—in both Panel C and D, the βs are positive, significant at the 1% level
in column (1) although not statistically significant in column (4) with the full fixed effects.
This result suggests that the risk capacity channel was operative even when we sort banks by
capital ratio as of the end of 2008 Q4 to focus on the within-bank variation. In sum, banks
with limited risk capacities preferred refinance mortgages to home purchase mortgages.11
We next implement a loan-level analysis which allows us to directly control local charac-
teristics using the loan locations. Our loan level analysis focuses on approval/denial decisions
of individual mortgage applications as a measure of lending behaviors. We examine whether
during the post period after 2008 Q4, banks with limited risk capacities (i) loosened the
11An overreaching speculation implies that new purchases could have been crowded out to a lesser extent if
QE had not been implemented to stimulate the refinancing demand.
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lending standard for refinance mortgages, while (ii) tightening the lending standard for home
purchase mortgages, relative to their well-capitalized counterparts. Specifically, we estimate
the following linear probability model:
I Loan Approvalilct = αy + αq + αi + αc + β · I Post× Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1
+ φ · Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1 + θ ·Xl + γ ·Xi,t−1 + κ ·Xc,t−1 + ilct (3)
where for loan l in county c by bank i at time t, I Loan Approval equals 1 if approved and 0 if
denied. In addition to the bank characteristics Xi,t−1, we also control for loan characteristics
Xl such as income and loan to income ratio, and local economic characteristics Xc,t−1, i.e., log
Population, log Income per Capita, unemployment rate, and Home Price Index, and county
fixed effects (αc). By thoroughly controlling for local economic conditions, we attempt to
isolate changes in risk appetite across banks within a local area between the two types of
mortgage applications. Our variable of interest is the coefficient β on the interaction of I Post
and Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1.
[ Table 4 here ]
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results. Columns (1), (3), (5) report the loan
approval for refinance mortgages whereas columns (2), (4), (6) report the loan approval for
home purchase mortgages. Columns (1)-(2) only include year fixed effects and quarter fixed
effects, columns (3)-(4) include additional bank fixed effects, and columns (5)-(6) include
additional county fixed effects. In columns (5)-(6), which is our preferred specification with
a full set of fixed effects, we find similar results to the bank-level results. During the post
period after 2008 Q4, banks with low risk capacities were more willing to approve refinance
mortgages (positive and statistically significant β) while less willing to approve home purchase
mortgages (negative and statistically significant β) compared to banks with no binding risk
capacity. In other words, they tightened their lending standards for home purchase mortgages
while loosening the standards for refinance mortgages.
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Panel B reports similar regression results except we use Low Tier 1 Capital2008.Q4, a dummy
variable that equals 1 for banks with bottom 25% tier 1 capital ratio right before the treatment
period, instead of Low Tier 1 Capitali,t−1 as before. Results for this within-bank comparison
are similar to Panel A.
4.2. Testing the Operating Capacity Channel
We first examine the time series variation in the average screening time for mortgage origi-
nations in Figure 4. Here, we plot the average number of days taken for an application to
be approved/denied after the application dates. We find two interesting patterns regarding
the screening time: (1) the average screening time per application increased rapidly after the
Lehman failure in 2008 Q4 and also after the announcement of QE3 in September 2012, and
(2) refinance loan screening is usually faster than home purchase loan screening.
Our main measure of bank-level operating capacity is the fraction of “incomplete” appli-
cations at the end of each quarter out of the total mortgage applications received in that
quarter. That is, we associate a higher fraction of incomplete applications with a lower op-
erating capacity for that bank since it is rolling over most of its applications unfinished to
the next quarter. Note that this measure is particularly well-suited to our experiment setup,
studying the effect after 2008 Q4—if banks face a relatively low volume of incoming mortgage
applications and/or have a low average screening time, then the measure would be less infor-
mative in capturing cross-sectional variations in operating capacity. However, if banks face a
surge in mortgage applications (e.g. due to the QE) and/or the average screening time gets
longer as in the post period after 2008 Q4, then the measure would more effectively capture
the cross-sectional variations in operating capacity of different banks.
We compare banks with ample operating capacity to banks with limited operating capacity,
particularly examining how the lending patterns of the two groups differed in the pre period
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and the the post period. Concretely, we estimate the following regression:
Yit = αy + αq + αi + αHQ,y + β · I Post× Low Operating Capacityi,t−1
+ φ · Low Operating Capacityi,t−1 + γ ·Xi,t−1 + it (4)
where Low Operating Capacityi,t−1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the top quartile
banks in terms of the fraction of incomplete applications in the previous quarter, and zero
otherwise. As before, I Post equals 1 for the post period of 2009Q1 to 2013Q4, and zero
otherwise. αy is the year fixed effect, αq is the quarter fixed effect, αi is the bank fixed effect,
and αHQ,y is the Headquarter State × Y ear fixed effect. Xi,t−1 includes 1 quarter lagged
controls for bank characteristics such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio,
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio, CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio, and Loan Processing
Time reflecting the average time to process mortgage originations. Our variable of interest is
the coefficient β on the interaction of I Post and Low Operating Capacityi,t−1.
Note that risk capacity could also affect the degree of operating capacity, as more careful
risk management or tighter lending standards would require more careful screening all else
being equal, and thus would consume extra operating capacity. Therefore, we control for the
effect of changes in risk capacity on operating capacity by adding bank-level 4-quarter moving
average loan processing times (Loan Processing Time).
[ Table 5 here ]
Table 5 presents the estimation results with all banks in our sample. Panel A and B
use all banks in our sample. Panel A reports the results with the total amount of mortgage
originations and Panel B reports the results with the total number of mortgage originations.
Since the results are similar, we will discuss Panel A. Column (1) reports the regression results
on the log amount of refinance mortgage originations, column (2) reports the results on the
log amount of home purchase mortgage originations, and column (3) reports the results on
the difference between the two dependent variables in columns (1)-(2). We find that, during
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the post period, banks with low operating capacity increase refinance originations more but
decrease home purchase originations more compared to the control groups. The difference
between the two types of mortgage originations is statistically significant and positive.
Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) except with the addition of bank fixed effects
and Headquarter State × Y ear fixed effects. As discussed earlier, it would be important to
control for the loan demand in local markets to isolate the supply-side effect. Hence, we
control for the potential differences in mortgage demand by adding fixed effects for the banks’
headquarter state by year. That is, we are comparing banks with low operating capacities to
other banks with high operating capacities that are headquartered in the same state within a
calendar year. Results are similar to columns (1)-(3). Compared to their pre period lending
behaviors, banks with low operating capacities increased more refinancing originations but
decreased more home purchase originations than their peers in similar local markets during
the post period.
Nonetheless, there still can be local factors that might have affected our measure of low
operating capacity and haven’t been entirely controlled for. For instance, operating capacity
will be lower if banks face stronger demand during the post period through monetary stim-
ulus. Under the assumption that stronger local mortgage demand implies greater borrowing
demand for both refinances and home purchases, this unexplained factor should work against
our prediction of more originations in home purchase as well as refinancing for such banks.
However, we find contrary results on home purchase originations. In that regard, our find-
ing of the reduction in home purchase loans for banks with low operating capacity can be
considered the lower bound of the actual effect.
To better control for local economic factors, we next limit our sample to local banks in
Panel C and D. Here, we define local banks as those that collect more than 70% of their
loan applications from a single MSA on average. On top of the same regression specification
in Panel A and B, we then add county-level controls including log Population, log Income
per Capita, unemployment rate, and home price index. Results are similar to what we find
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in Panel A and B but the substitution effects are more pronounced, reflecting clearer cross-
sectional comparisons after controlling for local factors that might have affected demand side
effects on mortgage applications.
We next examine within-bank differences in order to better mitigate the confounding
effects, such as differential demand across banks or changes in lending standards. Here, we
compare a bank’s lending practices across different counties that the given bank operates
in. We first calculate the county level operating capacity analogously as we did for the
bank level operating capacity. For each bank at each time period, we then sort this bank’s
“markets”, i.e., counties that this bank lends to, into two groups using the bank’s median
operating capacity in counties—high operating capacity (supposedly less busy) counties and
low operating capacity (busy) counties. We then examine whether a bank, during the post
period, increased refinance originations but reduced home purchase originations in counties
with limited operating capacity relative to its other non-busy counties. We thus run the
following regression:
Yict = αi,t + αi,c + αMSA,t + β · I Post× Busy County Within Banki,t−1
+ φ · Busy County Within Banki,t−1 + γ ·Xi,t−1 + κ ·Xc,t−1 + ict (5)
where the dependent variables are the mortgage originations (refinances, home purchases,
or the differences between the two) by bank i in county c at time t. Busy County Within
Banki,t−1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the county is below the median operating
capacity among counties where the bank operates, and zero otherwise. I Post equals 1 for
the post period of 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4, and zero otherwise. Xi,t−1 includes 1 quarter lagged
controls for bank characteristics such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio,
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio, CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio, and log Change
in Total Application which reflects loan demand changes at the bank level. Xc,t−1 includes
county-level controls of the previous year such as log Population, log Income per Capita,
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Unemployment Rate, and HPI.
We include several layers of fixed effects: αi,t is the bank-year-quarter fixed effect, αi,c is
the bank-county fixed effect, and αMSA,t is the MSA-year-quarter fixed effect. The first effect
takes out variations in lending behavior of a given bank over time, and the second effect takes
out the differences in mean origination volumes across the different counties for a bank. The
third effect takes out the variations in MSA-level activities, so that we can analyze different
lending behaviors across the counties within a MSA for a given bank, which should face similar
local economic conditions.
[ Table 6 here ]
Table 6 reports the estimation results. Without the effect of operating capacity on banks’
preferences over the types of mortgages, we naturally expect that the variations in operating
capacity (i.e. “busyness”) across counties should reflect the differences in local loan demand.
That is, we should observe tighter operating capacity in the counties with stronger loan
demand, and in these regions, demand for both mortgage types should be stronger. However,
our results are the opposite – during the post period after 2008 Q4, banks originated less home
purchase mortgages in the counties where they have tight operating capacity as in columns (2)
and (5), while originated more refinance mortgages in the same counties as in column (1) and
(4).12 The difference in the two types of originations is wider in counties with tighter operating
capacity as in columns (3) and (6). These results support our view that the operating capacity
channel contributes to the crowding out of home purchase loans.
4.3. Was There an Aggregate Effect?
So far, we find two supply side channels that contribute to banks’ substitution of home pur-
chase loans for refinance loans. However, this bank-level finding does not always imply that
12Note that β in column (1) based on $ amount is positive but insignificant. However, we think that the
number of originations in column (4) should be a more accurate measure to examine the impact of operating
capacity since loan officers care more about finishing incomplete application files that are in their to-do lists.
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home purchase borrowers had less access to credit in their local markets—the limited credit
supply by banks with binding capacity constraints could have been filled by other lenders in
local markets, e.g., other banks with unconstrained capacity or non-banks.
Although the activity of non-bank lenders significantly declined after the financial crisis and
most of the changes in originations were due to the changes in origination by bank lenders
as in Figures 2 and 3, we further examine the county-level aggregate lending variations to
analyze this possibility. We create county-level aggregate mortgage originations, including
both banks and non-banks, and analyze how aggregate lending in a county with a constrained
banking sector (either limited risk capacity or operating capacity) changed during the post
period after 2008 Q4, compared to a county with a less constrained banking sector.
To define counties with a constrained banking sector, we calculate county-level risk capacity
and county-level operating capacity measures. County-level risk capacity is a weighted average
of banks’ Tier 1 Capital Ratios, weighted by the number of mortgage applications of banks
in the county. Low Tier 1 Capitalc,t−1 is a dummy that equals to 1 for counties in the
bottom 25% in terms of county-level risk capacity, and zero for counties in the top 25% of
the same measure. Hence, we compare counties in the bottom quartile to those in the top
quartile. County-level operating capacity is an inverse of the weighted average fraction of
banks’ unprocessed mortgage applications, weighted by the number of mortgage applications
of banks in the county. Again, Low Operating Capacityc,t−1 is a dummy that equals 1 for
counties in the bottom 25% in terms of county-level operating capacity, and zero for counties
in the top 25% of the same measure.
We run the following yearly panel regressions:
Yct = αc + αstate,t + β · I Post× Low Tier 1 Capitalc,t−1
+ φ · Low Tier 1 Capitalc,t−1 + γ ·Xc,t−1 + ct (6)
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for the risk capacity channel, and
Yct = αc + αstate,t + β · I Post× Low Operating Capacityc,t−1
+ φ · Low Operating Capacityc,t−1 + γ ·Xc,t−1 + ct (7)
for the operating capacity channel. I Post equals 1 for the post period of 2009 Q1 to 2013
Q4, and zero otherwise. Xc,t−1 includes county-level controls from the previous year such as
log Population, log Income per Capita, Unemployment Rate, and HPI. We include county
fixed effects and State × Year fixed effects. Our variable of interest is β, by which we compare
well-capitalized counties (top quartile) to thinly capitalized counties (bottom quartile) on how
aggregate mortgage originations of the two types changed during the post period.
[ Table 7 here ]
Table 7 reports regression results on the county-level risk capacity channel. Panel A reports
results on the total amount of mortgage originations. Column (1) reports the regression results
on the log amount of refinance mortgage originations, column (2) reports the results on the
log amount of home purchase mortgage originations, and column (3) reports the results on the
differences of the two dependent variables in columns (1)-(2). We find that the counties with
low risk capacity had more refinance mortgage originations, but less home purchase mortgage
originations than the counties with high risk capacity in the same state. The difference of
the two in column (3) is positive and significant, which indicates the crowding out effect from
refinance mortgages to home purchase mortgages. Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns
(1)-(3) except with the addition of county control variables. The results are similar but more
significant. Panel B reports results on the total number of mortgage originations and finds
similar but stronger effects.
Panel C and D also report regression results on the county-level risk capacity channel but
with a different measure of county-level risk capacity. We use banks’ Tier 1 Capital Ratio as
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of 2008 Q4 to construct a dummy of Low Tier 1 Capitalc,2008.Q4. Our findings are robust and
significant.
[ Table 8 here ]
Table 8 reports regression results on the county-level operating capacity channel. Panel
A reports results on the total amount of mortgage originations. Column (1) reports the
regression results on the log amount of refinance mortgage originations, column (2) reports
the results on the log amount of home purchase mortgage originations, and column (3) reports
the results on the differences of the two dependent variables in columns (1)-(2). We find that
the counties with low operating capacity had more refinance mortgage originations but less
home purchase mortgage originations than the counties with high risk capacity in the same
state. Note that the aggregate effect on home purchase lending is rather weaker in column
(2) while the aggregate effect on refinance lending is strongly positive in column (1). This
could be due to the fact that the operating capacity effect might have been dampened by
strong loan demand. The difference of the two originations in column (3) is significant and
positive indicating that the gap between refinance originations and home purchase originations
widened more in the counties with limited operating capacity. Columns (4)-(6) are similar to
columns (1)-(3) except for the addition of county control variables. The results are similar
and more significant. Panel B reports results on the total number of mortgage originations
and finds similar but stronger effects.
5. Conclusion
We propose and examine two channels that impede banks’ financial intermediation: the risk
capacity channel that arises when banks have limited capacity for risk taking, and the op-
erating capacity channel that arises from loan officers’ limited capacity for processing and
screening loan applications. When banks face these capacity constraints, which is particu-
larly the case after 2008, they would try to substitute home purchase loans with refinance
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loans. Our results imply that banks with limited capacities would try to substitute loans to
potential home buyers with loans to refinancing borrowers, who are existing home owners.
This substitution would prevail more if there is an exogenous increase in refinancing demand,
e.g. stimulated by monetary policy. When banks are facing binding capacity, the monetary
stimulus would induce an increase in both refinancing and home purchase borrowing demand,
but banks might show this substitution behavior by reducing home purchase originations.
This not only limits the credit access of certain borrowers, possibly younger and with lower
wealth, but there could be a macroeconomic effect if these rationed borrowers have a greater
marginal propensity for consumption. Hence, while our analysis mainly focuses on the dis-
tributional impact, this mechanism also has novel macroeconomic implications on monetary
transmissions through the bank lending channel.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
We report the summary statistics of variables. Panel A reports the summary statistics based on full sample. We
report bank-level and loan-level variables. Refinance(#) is the number of mortgage originations for refinance
by a bank in a quarter, Refinance($ mils) is the amount of mortgage originations for refinance by a bank in a
quarter, Purchase(#) is the number of mortgage originations for home purchase by a bank in a quarter, and
Purchase($ mils) is the amount of mortgage originations for home purchase by a bank in a quarter. Bank
characteristics includes Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio, RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio,
CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio, and Tier 1 Capital Ratio. Operating Capacity is the fraction of
“uncompleted” applications as of the last date of each quarter out of the total applications received in that
quarter. Loan Processing Time is the average number of days spent screening an application for a bank
in a quarter. I Refinance is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the loan type is refinance mortgage and 0
otherwise. I Loan Approval is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the loan is being approved and 0 otherwise.
log Income is the log of household income as of mortgage application. Loan to Income is the ratio of loan
amount to income. Loan Size is the size of loan in thousand dollars. County-level control variables include log
Population, log Income per Capita, Unemployment Rate, and the HPI from the CoreLogic. Panel B reports
the summary statistics by the Tier 1 Capital level. Low Tier 1 Capital is a dummy variable for the bottom
25% banks with low Tier 1 Capital Ratio. The top panel reports the summary statistics of banks in Low
Tier 1 Capital group and the bottom panel reports the summary statistics of the others. Panel C of Table
1.1 reports the summary statistics by the Operating Capacity. Low Operating Capacity is a dummy variable
for top 25% banks with high Operating Capacity. The top panel reports the summary statistics of banks in
Low Operating Capacity group and the bottom panel reports the summary statistics of the others. Quarterly
bank control variables are winsorized at 0.5% and 99.5% levels.
Panel A: All Samples
Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Bank-level Variables
Refinance(#) 114669 200.12 3070.67 7 20 52
Refinance($ mils) 114669 35.90 662.27 0.69 2.11 6.33
Purchase(#) 114669 94.31 1635.80 4 11 27
Purchase($ mils) 114669 19.96 380.41 0.53 1.47 4.28
Assets 114669 3228 47077 128 255 568
Liquid Asset Ratio 114669 0.28 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.36
Loan to Deposit Ratio 114669 0.82 0.18 0.71 0.83 0.94
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio 114669 0.76 0.14 0.67 0.78 0.86
CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio 114669 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10
NPL Ratio 114669 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 114669 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.16
Operating Capacity 111656 0.31 0.17 0.20 0.30 0.40
Loan Processing Time 100242 33.66 16.04 23.20 31.74 41.46
Loan-level Variables
I Refinance 3223338 0.69 0.46 0 1 1
I Loan Approval 3223338 0.52 0.50 0 1 1
log Income 2923942 11.29 0.74 10.82 11.28 11.749
Loan to Income 2923942 2.07 1.50 0.94 1.84 2.86
Loan Size ($000) 3223338 189 178 74 142 248
log Population 3123474 12.85 1.51 11.84 13.02 13.81
log Income per Capita 3123474 10.57 0.27 10.38 10.55 10.73
Unemployment Rate 3120886 6.66 2.56 4.71 6.10 8.26
HPI 2872501 153.3 40.5 124.8 142.9 173.7
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Table 1 Continues
Panel B: By Tier 1 Capital
Low Tier 1 Capital = 1 Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Bank-level Variables
Refinance(#) 29128 602.87 6020.65 8 25 82
Refinance($ mils) 29128 111.73 1296.90 0.97 3.29 11.19
Purchase(#) 29128 278.21 3196.91 5 15 49
Purchase($ mils) 29128 62.12 747.3 0.76 2.42 8.09
Assets 29128 10982 92899 188 402 1016
Liquid Asset Ratio 29128 0.20 0.09 0.14 0.19 0.25
Loan to Deposit Ratio 29128 0.90 0.14 0.82 0.91 0.99
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio 29128 0.74 0.15 0.65 0.76 0.85
CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio 29128 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.16
NPL Ratio 29128 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 29128 0.09 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.10
Operating Capacity 28338 0.32 0.17 0.21 0.31 0.41
Loan Processing Time 25470 34.99 15.86 24.56 33.26 43.00
Loan-level Variables
I Refinance 2599021 0.69 0.46 0 1 1
I Loan Approval 2599021 0.49 0.50 0 0 1
log Income 2342313 11.30 0.74 10.82 11.28 11.74
Loan to Income 2342313 2.10 1.50 0.97 1.87 2.90
Loan Size ($000) 2599021 193 180 76 146 252
Low Tier 1 Capital = 0 Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Bank-level Variables
Refinance(#) 85541 62.98 472.18 7 18 45
Refinance($ mils) 85541 10.08 112.32 0.63 1.85 5.26
Purchase(#) 85541 31.68 302.53 4 10 23
Purchase($ mils) 85541 8.85 153.43 0.48 1.28 3.45
Assets 85541 588 2190 116 223 475
Liquid Asset Ratio 85541 0.31 0.14 0.21 0.29 0.39
Loan to Deposit Ratio 85541 0.79 0.18 0.67 0.80 0.91
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio 85541 0.76 0.14 0.68 0.78 0.87
CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio 85541 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07
NPL Ratio 85541 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 85541 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.17
Operating Capacity 83318 0.31 0.17 0.19 0.29 0.40
Loan Processing Time 74772 33.20 16.08 22.78 31.21 40.89
Loan-level Variables
I Refinance 624317 0.66 0.47 0 1 1
I Loan Approval 624317 0.65 0.48 0 1 1
log Income 581629 11.26 0.74 10.78 11.24 11.70
Loan to Income 581629 1.94 1.45 0.84 1.71 2.72
Loan Size ($000) 624317 171 167 62 128 225
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Table 1 Continues
Panel C: By Operating Capacity
Low Operating Capacity = 1 Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Bank-level Variables
Refinance(#) 18791 412.86 5710.88 5 16 54
Refinance($ mils) 18791 91.56 1274.67 0.74 2.63 9.6
Purchase(#) 18791 143.23 2141.46 4 11 31
Purchase($ mils) 18791 37.07 529.18 0.67 2.15 6.67
Assets 18791 6898 81195 134 292 707
Liquid Asset Ratio 18791 0.28 0.14 0.18 0.26 0.36
Loan to Deposit Ratio 18791 0.83 0.20 0.71 0.84 0.96
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio 18791 0.78 0.16 0.69 0.81 0.91
CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio 18791 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10
NPL Ratio 18791 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 18791 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.13 0.17
Operating Capacity 18791 0.57 0.15 0.47 0.53 0.62
Loan Processing Time 16360 47.88 19.63 35.65 45.79 56.62
Loan-level Variables
I Refinance 997672 0.73 0.44 0 1 1
I Loan Approval 997672 0.52 0.50 0 1 1
log Income 923341 11.40 0.74 10.92 11.37 11.84
Loan to Income 923341 2.32 1.49 1.28 2.07 3.05
Loan Size ($000) 997672 225 189 105 177 290
Low Operating Capacity = 0 Obs Mean Std.Dev. p25 p50 p75
Bank-level Variables
Refinance(#) 92865 158.77 2215.38 8 20 51
Refinance($ mils) 92865 25.18 456.25 0.7 2.06 5.90
Purchase(#) 92865 85.29 1528.86 5 11 26
Purchase($ mils) 92865 16.80 347.72 0.52 1.40 3.94
Assets 92865 2534 37205 129 251 550
Liquid Asset Ratio 92865 0.28 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.36
Loan to Deposit Ratio 92865 0.82 0.18 0.71 0.83 0.94
RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio 92865 0.75 0.14 0.67 0.77 0.86
CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio 92865 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.10
NPL Ratio 92865 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 92865 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.16
Operating Capacity 92865 0.26 0.12 0.17 0.26 0.34
Loan Processing Time 83673 30.85 13.46 21.92 29.81 38.15
Loan-level Variables
I Refinance 2166951 0.67 0.47 0 1 1
I Loan Approval 2166951 0.52 0.50 0 1 1
log Income 1948324 11.25 0.74 10.78 11.23 11.70
Loan to Income 1948324 1.96 1.48 0.79 1.71 2.78
Loan Size ($000) 2166951 173 171 61 127 228
33
Table 2: Banks’ Mortgage originations by Loan Purpose during 2009 to 2013
We report the panel regression results of the banks’ mortgage originations by loan purpose during 2009-2013.
We use bank-quarter observations from 2004 to 2013. Panel A reports the results using the total amount of
mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter as a dependent variable. Column (1) reports the result on log
amount of refinance mortgage originations (logRefi$). The main independent variable is the time dummy for
2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post). Other independent variables include 1 quarter lagged bank-level characteristics
such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio, RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio, CI Loan to
Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio, and Tier 1 Capital Ratio. We do not report bank-level controls for brevity. We
also include Quarter fixed effects. Column (2) reports the result on log amount of home purchase mortgage
originations (logP$). Column (3) reports the result on the difference of two dependent variables ((1)-(2))
in columns (1) and (2). Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) except the additional Bank fixed
effects. Panel B reports the results using the total number of mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter as
a dependent variable (logRefi#, logP#). Specifications are the same as in Panel A. The table reports point
estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, *
denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5)
I Post 0.297*** -0.094*** 0.391*** 0.223*** -0.211*** 0.434***
(15.55) (-5.89) (25.82) (12.58) (-13.91) (28.00)
Observations 114,669 114,669 114,669 114,518 114,518 114,518
R-squared 0.500 0.564 0.047 0.788 0.793 0.385
Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5)
I Post 0.013 -0.119*** 0.132*** 0.021 -0.208*** 0.228***
(0.72) (-7.64) (9.45) (1.38) (-15.27) (16.95)
Observations 114,669 114,669 114,669 114,518 114,518 114,518
R-squared 0.445 0.490 0.031 0.843 0.822 0.495
Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3: Banks’ Risk Capacity and Loan Substitution
We report the panel regression results of the effect of bank’s risk capacity on the bank’s mortgage originations by loan purpose. We use bank-quarter
observations from 2004 to 2013. Panel A and B report the results using time-varying measure of banks’ risk capacity. In Panel A, the dependent
variables are the total amount of mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter. Column (1) reports the result on log amount of refinance mortgage
originations (logRefi$). Main independent variables are a time dummy for 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post), a dummy for the bottom 25% banks with low
Tier 1 Capital Ratio in the previous quarter (Low Tier 1 Capital t−1), and the interaction between the two variables. Other independent variables
include 1 quarter lagged bank-level characteristics such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio, RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio, CI
Loan to Total Loan Ratio, and NPL Ratio. We do not report the bank-level controls for brevity. We also include Year fixed effects and Quarter
fixed effects. Column (2) reports the result on log amount of home purchase mortgage originations (logP$). Column (3) reports the result on the
difference of two dependent variables ((1)-(2)) in columns (1) and (2). Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) except the additional Bank fixed
effects and Headquarter (state) × Year fixed effects. Columns (7)-(9) are similar to columns (1)-(3) except excluding Year fixed effect but including
Bank FE, Headquarter FE, and I Post. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the total number of mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter
(logRefi#, logP#). Specifications are the same as in Panel A. Panel C and D report the results using the measure of banks’ risk capacity as of 2008
Q4. Regression specifications are same as in Panel A and B. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard errors
are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 0.110*** -0.049 0.159*** 0.075*** -0.053** 0.127*** 0.094*** -0.009 0.103***
(2.81) (-1.41) (5.26) (2.65) (-1.98) (5.01) (3.17) (-0.32) (3.95)
Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 -0.171*** -0.061** -0.111*** -0.087*** 0.022 -0.109*** -0.083*** 0.041** -0.124***
(-5.80) (-2.12) (-5.01) (-4.22) (1.16) (-6.11) (-3.90) (2.09) (-6.66)
I Post 0.211*** -0.202*** 0.412***
(11.40) (-12.81) (25.32)
Observations 114,669 114,669 114,669 114,515 114,515 114,515 114,518 114,518 114,518
R-squared 0.505 0.571 0.059 0.797 0.803 0.409 0.788 0.793 0.386
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
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Table 3 Continues
Panel B: Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 0.089** -0.078** 0.167*** 0.063*** -0.080*** 0.143*** 0.091*** -0.025 0.117***
(2.34) (-2.22) (5.80) (2.60) (-3.18) (6.03) (3.56) (-0.96) (4.76)
Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 -0.240*** -0.091*** -0.149*** -0.077*** 0.036** -0.113*** -0.073*** 0.053*** -0.127***
(-7.69) (-3.01) (-6.65) (-4.45) (2.08) (-6.96) (-4.11) (2.96) (-7.47)
I Post 0.006 -0.197*** 0.204***
(0.40) (-14.29) (14.64)
Observations 114,669 114,669 114,669 114,515 114,515 114,515 114,518 114,518 114,518
R-squared 0.451 0.498 0.049 0.854 0.834 0.522 0.844 0.822 0.496
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Panel C: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.4Q 0.110*** -0.010 0.120*** 0.030 -0.090*** 0.120*** 0.056 -0.067* 0.123***
(2.70) (-0.27) (3.63) (0.80) (-2.73) (3.87) (1.48) (-1.94) (3.85)
Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.4Q -0.116*** -0.040 -0.077**
(-2.62) (-0.93) (-2.46)
I Post 0.217*** -0.199*** 0.416***
(11.22) (-12.22) (24.34)
Observations 97,234 97,234 97,234 97,221 97,221 97,221 97,221 97,221 97,221
R-squared 0.496 0.566 0.061 0.785 0.791 0.396 0.774 0.779 0.372
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 3 Continues
Panel D: Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.4Q 0.124*** -0.016 0.140*** 0.015 -0.126*** 0.142*** 0.057* -0.089*** 0.146***
(3.26) (-0.46) (4.38) (0.48) (-3.98) (4.77) (1.72) (-2.71) (4.78)
Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.4Q -0.197*** -0.072 -0.125***
(-4.36) (-1.63) (-3.94)
I Post 0.018 -0.190*** 0.208***
(1.11) (-13.14) (14.19)
Observations 97,234 97,234 97,234 97,221 97,221 97,221 97,221 97,221 97,221
R-squared 0.452 0.501 0.047 0.842 0.821 0.504 0.830 0.807 0.476
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4: Banks’ Risk Capacity and Loan Approval
We report the panel regression results of the effect of bank’s risk capacity on the likelihood of loan approval by loan purpose. We use 5% random
sample from loan-level HMDA stratified by year and county with 4 bins during 2004 to 2013. The dependent variables are the indicator for approved
loans which equals to 1 if the loan is originated and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the results using the time-varying measure of banks’ risk capacity.
Main independent variables are a time dummy for 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post), a dummy for the bottom 25% banks with low Tier 1 Capital
Ratio in previous quarter (Low Tier 1 Capital t−1), and the interaction between the two variables. Other independent variables include applicant’s
characteristics such as log Income, Loan to Income ratio; 1 quarter lagged bank-level characteristics such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to
Deposit Ratio, RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio, CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio; and county-level controls from previous year such as log
Population, log Income per Capita, Unemployment Rate, HPI. We do not report bank-level and county-level controls for brevity. Columns (1)-(2)
include Year fixed effects and Quarter fixed effects. Column (1) reports on the likelihood of loan approval for refinance mortgages and column (2)
reports on the likelihood of loan approval for home purchase mortgages. Columns (3)-(4) are similar to columns (1)-(2) except the addition of Bank
fixed effects. Columns (5)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(2) except additional Bank fixed effects and County fixed effects. Columns (7)-(8) are
similar to columns (5)-(6) except excluding Year fixed effects but including I Post. Panel B reports the results using bank’s risk capacity as of 2008
Q4. Regression specifications are same as in Panel A. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Using Time Varying Measure of Banks’ Risk Capacity
Refinance Purchase Refinance Purchase Refinance Purchase Refinance Purchase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables I Loan Approval
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 -0.020 -0.211*** 0.080*** -0.053* 0.079*** -0.053* 0.076*** -0.052**
(-0.44) (-3.83) (4.18) (-1.93) (4.06) (-1.95) (5.44) (-2.57)
Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 0.037 0.133*** -0.053*** 0.018 -0.052*** 0.019 -0.041*** 0.018
(0.81) (2.87) (-5.00) (1.27) (-4.97) (1.30) (-3.97) (1.38)
I Post -0.040*** 0.031***
(-4.35) (3.18)
log Income 0.058*** 0.033*** 0.050*** 0.035*** 0.048*** 0.035*** 0.047*** 0.034***
(6.34) (4.31) (5.50) (7.61) (5.31) (7.62) (4.97) (7.73)
Loan to Income -0.004 -0.004 -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.010*** -0.009***
(-1.57) (-1.14) (-3.03) (-3.34) (-3.84) (-3.68) (-4.03) (-3.75)
Observations 1,831,783 761,818 1,831,349 761,318 1,831,349 761,318 1,831,349 761,318
R-squared 0.050 0.073 0.090 0.135 0.092 0.136 0.089 0.135
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4 Continues
Panel B: Using Banks’ Risk Capacity as of 2008 Q4
Refinance Purchase Refinance Purchase Refinance Purchase Refinance Purchase
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Variables I Loan Approval
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.Q4 0.063*** -0.085*** 0.062*** -0.064** 0.061*** -0.064** 0.055*** -0.065***
(2.82) (-2.86) (2.90) (-2.14) (2.81) (-2.14) (3.04) (-3.02)
Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.Q4 -0.050** 0.034*
(-2.32) (1.78)
I Post -0.019 0.047***
(-1.43) (4.59)
log Income 0.060*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.039***
(5.56) (5.97) (4.63) (11.32) (4.47) (11.12) (4.17) (11.17)
Loan to Income -0.002 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.008***
(-0.97) (-1.12) (-2.65) (-2.73) (-3.52) (-3.12) (-3.67) (-3.17)
Observations 1,485,863 580,456 1,485,803 580,382 1,485,803 580,382 1,485,803 580,382
R-squared 0.057 0.087 0.088 0.133 0.090 0.135 0.088 0.133
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5: Banks’ Operating Capacity and Loan Substitution
We report the panel regression results of the effect of bank’s operating capacity on the bank’s mortgage originations by loan purpose. We use
bank-quarter observations from 2004 to 2013. Panel A and B use all banks in our sample. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the total amount
of mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter. Column (1) reports the result on log amount of refinance mortgage originations (logRefi$). Main
independent variables are a time dummy for 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post), a dummy for the top 25% banks with high fraction of unprocessed
mortgage application in previous quarter (Low Operating Capacity t−1), and the interaction between the two variables. Other independent variables
include 1 quarter lagged bank-level characteristics such as Loan Processing Time, the average date between loan applications to approval by a bank,
log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio, RE Loan to Total Loan Ratio, CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio, Tier 1 Capital
Ratio. We do not report bank-level controls for brevity. We also include Year fixed effects and Quarter fixed effects. Column (2) reports the
result on log amount of home purchase mortgage originations (logP$). Column (3) reports the result on the difference of two dependent variables
((1)-(2)) in columns (1) and (2). Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) except the addition of Bank fixed effects and Headquarter (state)
× I Post fixed effects. Columns (7)-(9) are similar to columns (1)-(2) except excluding Year fixed effect but including Bank FE, Headquarter
FE and I Post. In Panel B, the dependent variables are the total number of mortgage originations by a bank in a quarter (logRefi#, logP#).
Specifications are the same as in Panel A. Panel C and D only include local banks who get more than 70% loan applications from one state on
average. Regression specifications are similar to Panel A and B except additional MSA-level controls from previous year such as log Population,
log Income per Capita, Unemployment Rate, HPI. We do not report MSA-level controls for brevity. The table reports point estimates with
t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: All Banks, Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.291*** -0.067** 0.357*** 0.157*** -0.049** 0.206*** 0.193*** -0.034 0.227***
(8.33) (-2.14) (12.66) (6.57) (-2.13) (8.46) (7.81) (-1.46) (9.15)
Low Operating Capacity t−1 -0.159*** 0.123*** -0.282*** 0.199*** 0.223*** -0.024 0.179*** 0.222*** -0.043**
(-6.13) (4.78) (-13.37) (11.58) (14.33) (-1.36) (10.17) (13.78) (-2.38)
I Post 0.194*** -0.223*** 0.417***
(10.65) (-14.11) (25.62)
Loan Processing Time t−1 0.060*** 0.079*** -0.019*** 0.008* 0.019*** -0.012*** 0.011*** 0.033*** -0.021***
(8.85) (12.02) (-3.26) (1.93) (5.08) (-2.87) (2.70) (7.81) (-5.02)
Observations 100,033 100,033 100,033 99,900 99,900 99,900 99,902 99,902 99,902
R-squared 0.507 0.579 0.064 0.806 0.811 0.422 0.796 0.801 0.399
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5 Continues
Panel B: All Banks, Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.334*** -0.023 0.357*** 0.205*** -0.017 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.003 0.224***
(9.02) (-0.69) (13.10) (9.74) (-0.86) (10.72) (10.13) (0.16) (10.33)
Low Operating Capacity t−1 -0.498*** -0.145*** -0.353*** 0.083*** 0.185*** -0.102*** 0.079*** 0.186*** -0.107***
(-16.73) (-5.22) (-15.80) (5.66) (13.42) (-6.87) (5.07) (12.65) (-6.93)
I Post 0.002 -0.214*** 0.215***
(0.05) (-15.33) (15.27)
Loan Processing Time t−1 0.002 0.033*** -0.031*** -0.002 0.013*** -0.015*** 0.002 0.026*** -0.024***
(0.31) (5.26) (-5.38) (-0.54) (4.07) (-4.43) (0.56) (7.45) (-7.02)
Observations 100,033 100,033 100,033 99,900 99,900 99,900 99,902 99,902 99,902
R-squared 0.456 0.502 0.059 0.860 0.841 0.534 0.851 0.831 0.507
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5 Continues
Panel C: Local Banks, Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.222*** -0.118*** 0.340*** 0.128*** -0.079*** 0.207*** 0.144*** -0.066** 0.210***
(5.57) (-3.43) (9.69) (4.50) (-3.17) (6.80) (5.00) (-2.56) (6.71)
Low Operating Capacity t−1 -0.144*** 0.150*** -0.294*** 0.211*** 0.240*** -0.029 0.201*** 0.240*** -0.039*
(-4.97) (5.68) (-11.29) (10.11) (13.27) (-1.29) (9.48) (12.98) (-1.68)
I Post 0.156*** -0.246*** 0.402***
(6.67) (-12.43) (18.60)
Loan Processing Time t−1 0.051*** 0.059*** -0.008 0.004 0.015*** -0.011** 0.006 0.026*** -0.019***
(6.44) (8.80) (-1.26) (0.83) (3.58) (-2.20) (1.26) (5.82) (-3.78)
Observations 62,022 62,022 62,022 61,912 61,912 61,912 61,921 61,921 61,921
R-squared 0.357 0.452 0.055 0.731 0.727 0.394 0.718 0.714 0.371
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 5 Continues
Panel D: Local Banks, Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.278*** -0.058 0.336*** 0.177*** -0.043** 0.219*** 0.180*** -0.026 0.206***
(6.72) (-1.62) (10.36) (7.38) (-2.05) (8.96) (7.10) (-1.17) (7.78)
Low Operating Capacity t−1 -0.469*** -0.109*** -0.360*** 0.092*** 0.200*** -0.108*** 0.094*** 0.199*** -0.105***
(-14.35) (-3.78) (-13.37) (5.44) (13.33) (-6.12) (5.24) (12.53) (-5.47)
I Post -0.018 -0.220*** 0.202***
(-1.00) (-13.19) (11.48)
Loan Processing Time t−1 0.006 0.021*** -0.016** -0.004 0.010*** -0.015*** -0.002 0.021*** -0.023***
(0.72) (3.30) (-2.48) (-1.20) (3.13) (-3.84) (-0.61) (5.76) (-5.76)
Observations 62,022 62,022 62,022 61,912 61,912 61,912 61,921 61,921 61,921
R-squared 0.269 0.335 0.051 0.802 0.764 0.506 0.789 0.750 0.479
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter × Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
Headquarter FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 6: Operating Capacity Within Bank and Loan Substitution
We report the panel regression results of the effect of bank’s operating capacity (within bank) on the bank’s mortgage originations by loan purpose.
We use bank-county-quarter observations from 2004 to 2013. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variables are the total amount of mortgage originations
by a bank in a county during a quarter. Column (1) reports the result on log amount of refinance mortgage originations (logRefi$). Main independent
variables are the time dummy for 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post), a dummy for the top 50% counties with high fraction of unprocessed mortgage
applications in the previous quarter within a bank (Busy County Within Bank t−1), and the interaction between the two variables. Other independent
variables include 1 quarter lagged bank-level characteristics such as log Assets, Liquid Asset Ratio, Loan to Deposit Ratio, RE Loan to Total Loan
Ratio, CI Loan to Total Loan Ratio, NPL Ratio, and log Change in Total Application, the log difference in total mortgage application for a bank in
a county. We also include county-level controls from previous year such as log Population, log Income per Capita, Unemployment Rate, and HPI. We
do not report bank-level and county-level controls for brevity. We also include Bank × Quarter fixed effects, Bank × County fixed effects, and MSA
× Quarter fixed effects. Column (2) reports the result on log amount of home purchase mortgage originations (logP$). Column (3) reports the result
on the difference of two dependent variables ((1)-(2)) in columns (1) and (2). Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) with the total number of
mortgage originations as dependent variables (logRefi#, logP#). The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard
errors are clustered at the bank level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Total Amount of Mortgage Total Number of Mortgage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5)
I Post × Busy County Within Bank t−1 0.038 -0.044* 0.082*** 0.057** -0.040* 0.097***
(1.507) (-1.77) (3.68) (2.43) (-1.70) (3.71)
I Post 0.539*** -0.160*** 0.699*** 0.315*** -0.212*** 0.527***
(9.62) (-3.02) (12.19) (6.07) (-5.37) (9.35)
Busy County Within Bank t−1 0.002 0.046*** -0.044*** -0.031** 0.022* -0.053***
(0.14) (3.41) (-3.76) (-2.32) (1.80) (-4.17)
Observations 612,411 612,411 612,411 612,411 612,411 612,411
R-squared 0.503 0.479 0.298 0.462 0.433 0.376
Other Bank-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank × County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA × Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7: Risk Capacity and Loan Substitution, by County
We report the panel regression results of the effect of the county-level risk capacity on the county-level mortgage originations by loan purpose. We
construct county-year observations for 2004 to 2013 from bank-county-quarter observations. Panel A and B use the time-varying measure of county-
level risk capacity. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the total amount of mortgage originations in a county in a year. We aggregate mortgage
originations in a county in a year by loan purpose before we take a log. Column (1) reports the result on log amount of refinance mortgage originations
(logRefi$). Main independent variables are a dummy variable that equals to 1 for counties with the bottom 25% of county-level risk capacity, and
zero for counties with top 25% of it (Low Tier 1 Capital t−1), where the county-level risk capacity is the weighted average Tier 1 Capital Ratio of
banks weighted by the number of mortgage application of banks in a county, the time dummy for 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post), and the interaction
between the two variables. We include County fixed effects and State × Year fixed effects. Column (2) reports the result on log amount of home
purchase mortgage originations (logP$). Column (3) reports the result on the difference of two dependent variables ((1)-(2)) in columns (1) and (2).
Columns (4)-(6) are similar to columns (1)-(3) with additional county-level controls from previous year such as log Population, log Income per Capita,
Unemployment Rate, and HPI. We do not report county-level controls for brevity. Columns (7)-(9) are similar to columns (4)-(6) except excluding
State×Year fixed effects but including State FE and I Post. Panel B reports similar results using the total number of mortgage originations in a
county in a year as a dependent variable (logRefi#, logP#). Panel C and D use the county-level risk capacity as of 2008 Q4. Regression specifications
are same as in Panel A and B except using Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.Q4, which is a dummy variable that equals to 1 for counties with bottom 25% of
county-level risk capacity, and zero for counties with the top 25% of it. The county-level risk capacity is the weighted average Tier 1 Capital Ratio
of banks as of 2008 Q4 weighted by the number of mortgage application of banks in a county. The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in
parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the county level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 0.037 -0.053 0.100*** 0.005 -0.142*** 0.147*** -0.047 -0.212*** 0.165***
(1.27) (-1.58) (3.47) (0.14) (-5.14) (5.57) (-1.63) (-7.29) (7.07)
Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 -0.032 0.037 -0.107** -0.052 -0.009 -0.043 -0.028 -0.117 0.089
(-0.86) (0.81) (-2.35) (-0.90) (-0.13) (-0.96) (-0.41) (-1.26) (1.47)
I Post 0.425*** -0.628*** 1.053***
(14.30) (-19.80) (43.65)
Observations 14,594 14,480 14,456 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713
R-squared 0.343 0.718 0.649 0.736 0.919 0.911 0.213 0.668 0.741
County-level Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7 Continues
Panel B: Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 0.063** -0.124*** 0.193*** 0.036 -0.196*** 0.232*** -0.003 -0.240*** 0.236***
(2.51) (-4.11) (7.55) (1.06) (-7.12) (9.13) (-0.12) (-8.24) (10.03)
Low Tier 1 Capital t−1 -0.117*** 0.008 -0.154*** -0.109* -0.025 -0.085* -0.090 -0.134 0.044
(-3.91) (0.21) (-4.19) (-1.89) (-0.37) (-1.85) (-1.34) (-1.37) (0.77)
I Post 0.224*** -0.671*** 0.895***
(7.92) (-20.35) (37.31)
Observations 14,594 14,480 14,456 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713 5,713
R-squared 0.470 0.805 0.701 0.761 0.936 0.908 0.205 0.700 0.751
County-level Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.Q4 0.023 -0.091*** 0.109*** -0.047 -0.147*** 0.100*** -0.159*** -0.265*** 0.107***
(0.76) (-2.67) (4.08) (-1.35) (-4.50) (3.75) (-5.67) (-9.69) (4.92)
I Post 0.509*** -0.567*** 1.076***
(19.07) (-20.87) (49.57)
Observations 16,211 16,087 16,059 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620
R-squared 0.345 0.723 0.638 0.724 0.913 0.909 0.234 0.694 0.743
County-level Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7 Continues
Panel D: Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Tier 1 Capital 2008.Q4 0.031 -0.138*** 0.169*** -0.038 -0.199*** 0.161*** -0.133*** -0.285*** 0.153***
(1.14) (-4.46) (6.79) (-1.20) (-6.38) (6.03) (-4.90) (-10.66) (7.05)
I Post 0.321*** -0.630*** 0.951***
(12.56) (-24.01) (45.90)
Observations 16,211 16,087 16,059 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620 6,620
R-squared 0.513 0.811 0.693 0.771 0.935 0.906 0.299 0.738 0.749
County-level Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8: Operating Capacity and Loan Substitution, by County
We report the panel regression results of the effect of the county-level operating capacity on the county-level mortgage originations by loan purpose.
We construct county-year observations for 2004 to 2013 from bank-county-quarter observations. In Panel A, the dependent variables are the total
amount of mortgage originations in a county in a year. We aggregate mortgage originations in a county in a year by loan purpose before we take a log.
Column (1) reports the result on log amount of refinance mortgage originations (logRefi$). The main independent variables are a dummy variable that
equals to 1 for counties with bottom 25% of county-level operating capacity, and zero for counties with the top 25% of it (Low Operating Capacity
t−1), where the county-level operating capacity is the inverse of the weighted-average fraction of unprocessed mortgage applications of banks using
the number of mortgage applications of banks in a county, the time dummy for 2009 Q1 to 2013 Q4 (I Post), and the interaction between the two
variables. We include County fixed effects and State×Year fixed effects. Column (2) reports the result on log amount of home purchase mortgage
originations (logP$). Column (3) reports the result on the difference of two dependent variables ((1)-(2)) in columns (1) and (2). Columns (4)-(6)
are similar to columns (1)-(3) with additional county-level controls from previous year such as log Population, log Income per Capita, Unemployment
Rate, and HPI. We do not report county-level controls for brevity. Columns (7)-(9) are similar to columns (4)-(6) except excluding State×Year fixed
effects but including State FE and I Post. Panel B reports similar results using the total number of mortgage originations in a county in a year as a
dependent variable (logRefi#, logP#). The table reports point estimates with t-statistics in parentheses. All the standard errors are clustered at the
county level. ***, **, * denotes 1%, 5%, and 10% statistical significance.
Panel A: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi$ logP$ (1)-(2) logRefi$ logP$ (4)-(5) logRefi$ logP$ (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.120*** -0.034 0.159*** 0.113* -0.111 0.224*** 0.125*** 0.004 0.121***
(2.75) (-0.72) (3.40) (1.65) (-1.48) (4.66) (4.80) (0.10) (4.54)
Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.007 0.071* -0.074* -0.122** -0.053 -0.069* -0.067* -0.067 0.0003
(0.17) (1.91) (-1.82) (-2.19) (-1.19) (-1.91) (-1.75) (-1.54) (0.01)
I Post 0.195*** -0.911*** 1.106***
(6.76) (-22.54) (37.64)
Observations 14,594 14,482 14,462 5,091 5,091 5,091 5,091 5,091 5,091
R-squared 0.360 0.715 0.619 0.703 0.912 0.904 0.159 0.616 0.687
County-level Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8 Continues
Panel B: Total Number of Mortgage Originations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Variables logRefi# logP# (1)-(2) logRefi# logP# (4)-(5) logRefi# logP# (7)-(8)
I Post × Low Operating Capacity t−1 0.152*** -0.096** 0.247*** 0.144** -0.149* 0.293*** 0.179*** 0.020 0.159***
(4.12) (-2.20) (6.02) (2.22) (-1.82) (5.24) (7.08) (0.58) (5.83)
Low Operating Capacity t−1 -0.043 0.075** -0.124*** -0.138*** -0.028 -0.111*** -0.114*** -0.084* -0.030
(-1.28) (2.28) (-3.80) (-2.82) (-0.68) (-2.84) (-3.05) (-1.95) (-1.00)
I Post 0.013 -0.964*** 0.977***
(0.46) (-22.85) (31.80)
Observations 14,594 14,482 14,462 5,091 5,091 5,091 5,091 5,091 5,091
R-squared 0.493 0.803 0.677 0.742 0.931 0.903 0.168 0.651 0.697
County-level Controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State × Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
State FE No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
49
Figure 1: Total Number of Mortgage Applications by Loan Type
The figure shows the time series of the aggregate number of loan applications by loan type. We use Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to aggregate loan applications by loan type and by year-month. Panel
A reports the aggregate number of loan applications in HMDA data including both bank lenders and non-
bank lenders, with 12 month moving average. The blue line shows the number of mortgage applications for
all types of loans. The red line shows the number of mortgage applications for refinances and green line
shows the number of mortgage application for home purchases. Panel B reports the aggregate number of loan
applications in HMDA by bank lenders only, with 12 month moving average.
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Figure 2: Total Number of Mortgage Originations by Loan Type
The figure shows the time series of the aggregate number of loan originations by loan type. We use Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to aggregate the number of mortgage originations by loan type and by year-
quarter. Panel A reports the aggregate number of mortgage originations in HMDA data including both bank
lenders and non-bank lenders, with 4 quarter moving average. The blue line shows the number of mortgage
originations for all types of loans. The red line shows the number of mortgage originations for refinances and
green line shows the number of mortgage originations for home purchases. Panel B reports the aggregate
number of mortgage originations in HMDA by bank lenders only, with 4 quarter moving average.
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Figure 3: Total Amount of Mortgage Originations by Loan Type
The figure shows the time series of the aggregate amount of loan originations by loan type. We use Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) to aggregate the amount of mortgage originations by loan type and by year-
quarter. Panel A reports the aggregate amount of mortgage originations in HMDA data including both bank
lenders and non-bank lenders, with 4 quarter moving average. The blue line shows the amount of mortgage
originations for all types of loans. The red line shows the amount of mortgage originations for refinances and
green line shows the amount of mortgage originations for home purchases. Panel B reports the aggregate
amount of mortgage originations in HMDA by bank lenders alone, with 4 quarter moving average.
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Figure 4: Average Loan Processing Times by Loan Type
The figure shows the time series of average loan processing time by loan type. We use Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) to compute quarterly bank-level loan processing time as the average difference between
the loan application date and the decision date in a quarter. Panel A reports the average loan processing time
for all types of loans, with 4 quarter moving average. Panel B reports the average loan processing time by
loan type. The blue line shows the average loan processing time for home purchase mortgages and the red
line shows the average loan processing time for refinance mortgages.
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Figure 5: Mortgage Approval Rate by Loan Type
The figure shows the time series of mortgage approval rate by loan type. We use Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) to aggregate the number of mortgage applications and originations by loan type and by year-
quarter to compute mortgage approval rate. Panel A reports the mortgage approval rate in HMDA data
including both bank lenders and non-bank lenders, with 4 quarter moving average. The blue line shows the
mortgage approval rate for all types of loans. The red line shows the mortgage approval rate for refinances
and green line shows the mortgage approval rate for home purchases. Panel B reports the mortgage approval
rate in HMDA by bank lenders only, with 4 quarter moving average.
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